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This article is about globalisation and its local impact in a rural Community in
central Senegal. Following Kloos (2000b) globalisation is hère defined as thé
rise and extension of transnational, ultimately global régimes. A régime can be
defined as a more or less formalised constellation of human interdependencies
in which implicit and/or explicit principles, rules and decision-making
procédures created by actors enable as well as constrain their activities in a
given area of activity. A régime becomes transnational once thé constellation
of human interdependencies transcends state boundaries. We will go into one
such transnational regime, the 'donor regime', in which assistance from thé
west is acquired-if southern states meet certain conditions. One such condition
is applying 'good governance' by the aid-receiving country.
The centrality of 'good governance' in the approaches of donor institutions
dates from thé end of thé 1980s (World Bank, 1989, 1992, Hyden & Bratton,
1992). Within the donor Community the idea took root that liberal market
forces linked to political democracy and décentralisation will foster develop-
ment, in that it will lead to greater efficiency and to broader populär participa-
tion; the state has to change its rôle from centralist and dictating to enabling.
As a conséquence of this shift in development-thinking during the 1990s many
policies and programmes for promoting 'good governance' were initiated, such
as décentralisation programmes and donor or NGO projects aiming at 'strength-
ening civil society'.
It may be queried, however, whether this notion of good governance as a
motor of development that is spreading throughout thé world as a resuit of
donor interventions will make good its promises once implemented. Critics
argue that the paradigm of 'good governance' attends too little to thé local
context in which this général notion is to be implemented. Thus, as in the past,
in many African states thé political culture scarcely allows for independent
opération of local government councils or local organisations. Fowler (1991)
argues that the first priority of the state in Africa is to maintain its hegemony.
This is considered more important than providing scope for 'development'.
Although 'less state' is followed by a transfer of decision-making authority to
local government, state control is maintained. In Senegal, for example, state
influence in local rural councils is assured by a vertical System of party patron-
age, in which local patrons are clients of politicians at higher levels of adminis-
tration. Means of the state are used to keep the System going; people participate
in order to get access to thèse means (Blundo, 1991,1995,Gellar, 1996,Ribot,
1999).
The introduction of a multiparty democracy aligns with mainstream thinking
within the donor Community about the prerequisites for development. African
rulers, however, often argue that this System is not adapted to thé problems
southern countries hâve to face. For India, Kohli (1991) has demonstrated that
thé introduction of multiparty democracy has resulted in an increase of con-
flicts at thé local level. Political leaders competing to enlist thé population into
their clientèle hâve invoked not only political but also caste and ethnie argu-
ments. In his view traditional patterns of authority have been undermined by
thé émergence of competing elites willing to utilise any set of appealing sym-
bols and any available means, including violent means, for political mobilisa-
tion aimed at improving their électoral chances. The same has been argued for
Africa by many authors (cf. Wunsch & Olowu, 1995, Mohamed Salih, 1999).
Even if violence and conflict do not present themselves, the absence of a
political culture of participation and accountability means that multiparty
democracy in Africa is likely to remain confined to compétition among thé
political élite only (Buijtenhuis & Thiriot, 1995). For Senegal, for example, it
has often been argued that thé démocratie structures have simply been grafted
onto thé néo-patrimonial structures (Diop, 1993, Kante, 1994, Diop, 1993).
In this context, local élections are frequently dominated by party confrontation
and factionalism that centre around patron-client relationships and do not
focus on programmes or ideology (Buijtenhuijs and Thiriot, 1995 p. 73,
Blundo, 1996 p. 19, Kaag, 2001).
Although 'less state' was followed by more NGOs moving to assist local
communities in poverty alleviation and service delivery, in many places in
Africa it often proved difficult for NGOs to operate independently, for they
regularly become co-opted by governmental or party organisations. Self-help
associations, cooperating with NGOs, can become politicised, too. For example,
among thé Kamba in Kenya, local members of parliament used women's groups
for électoral purposes. The MP's strategy was to control thé votes of the largest
clans. Women, who were engaged in self-help activities, were sent to organise
thèse clans into local women's groups. In exchange for supporting thé self-help
activities the MP was able to control voting. Women's groups can thus be
diverted from serving women's interests to serving the interests of male politi-
cians (Wipper, 1987). As for Senegal, it was found that rural councillors often
block peasant leaders seeking to initiale development activities in thé commu-
nity because of factionalism and rivalry (Blundo, 1995, 1998, Ribot, 1999).
In short, the advocates of 'good governance' argue that once procédures and
institutions have been formally changed, good governance in the form of
accountability and representativeness and consequently administrative effi-
ciency will ensue. Critics, however, argue that the state seeks to maintain its
hegemony, endeavouring to keep a continued grip on local communities Local
rulers, by turning décentralisation measures to their own ends, are trying to
strengthen their own position. By pursuing self-interest and careensm, they
remain unaccountable to thé local population. On this view, globalisation, by
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imposing western ideas of good governance, will Increase political patronage,
factionalism and local conflicts by parachuting power, means and responsibili-
ties into a local context.
It Is our conviction, however, that both these visions of 'good governance
as a motor for development' are too partial. Formal reforms may be necessary
for change but are by no means sufficient, for the endeavours of actors to
maintain their hegemony or strengthen their power play an important rôle in
shaping the reality of policy measures. However, political patronage does not
only mean manipulation and state leverage, but may imply 'development' as
well. We shall set out our arguments with référence to an example of a rural
Community in Senegal. First, we briefly sketch thé général changes in gover-
nance that hâve take place in Senegal during the last 20 years, indicating the
influence exerted by the donor regime. We next present the rural Community
of Kaymor, thereby focusing on the rural council and its interaction with the
local Community. Then we move on to take a closer look at the women.s self-
help groups that have sprung up in response to NGO présence in the area.
Finally, some conclusions are drawn on the implications of 'good governance'
in rural Senegal.
By providing an account of the précise impact of a globalising donor regime,
we hope to contribute to the study of the dialectics between the local and the
global that was one of Peter Kloos' fascinations (Kloos, ZOOOa, 2000b).
'Good governance' in Senegal
Senegal began to pursue a décentralisation policy relatively early. The first step
was taken in 1972, with the création of rural communities as administrative
entities comprising a number of adjacent villages. The administration rests in
the hands of the rural council, made up of politically elected locals with a five-
year mandate. lts main tasks are land management, via land allocation, and the
exécution of modest projects. The council has its own budget, supplied mainly
from the taxes paid by the rural population. The second step was taken in
1990, when the president of the rural council was given greater authority, to
the detriment of higher levels of administration, particularly with respect to
budgetary matters. The third stage was set into motion in 1996, when some
competencies that had previously been the domain of the central state were
delegated to rural communities, which were given greater responsibilities in
several areas like healthcare, éducation and natural resource management.
Since the 1970s Senegal has been a multiparty democracy. In the country -
side, however, until recently the government party Parti Socialiste (PS) had
always ruled as a result of the winner-takes-all System. It was not until the
élections of 1996, when this system was abandoned, that other parties like the
Parti Démocratique Sénégalaise (PDS) and the Ligue Démocratique/Mouvement
Parti pour le Travail (LD/MPT) gained seats on rural councils, too.
From independence onwards (i.e. 1960) until thé mid 1980s the state was
the most important agency of development. Regional development organisa-
tions promoted and supported peanut and cereal cultivation and the produc-
tion of cotton. Village coopératives distributed seed and fertiliser on profitable
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conditions and co-ordinated crops sales. Because of unprofitable economie and
climatic conditions and mismanagement at all levels, however, this system
collapsed. As a conséquence of structural adjustment policy in 1984 a New
Agricultural Policy was launched, implying the restructuring or abolition of
many state development institutions. From then on the coopératives only
supplied seed and fertiliser on credit and only after a large down payment.
Henceforth the idea was that the populace itself should take greater initiative.
Thus, the government extension service CERP (Centre d'Expansion Rurale
Polyvalente) no longer contacted the population, but the reverse was now the
parole.
Less state was followed by more NGOs in Senegal, as mentioned, owing in
part to increased NGO funding by northern governments. There are now many
NGOs active in Senegal: in 1994 there were 225 NGOs registered and several
dozen more were then on their way.
The government encouraged the population to form associations. Thus, the
state extension service and the rural councils recommended the establishment
of local groups (groupements), which were sometimes rather loose associations
without any juridical status. However, the state extension service and the
councils also urged the founding of more formal organisations: in particular,
Groupements d'Intérêt Economique (GIE) for which thé Nouvelle Politique Agricole
of 1984 had paved thé way. The GIE allowed people to associate on a voluntary
basis in pursuit of a common économie goal; having registered at the Chamber
of Commerce and after a large down payment thé GIE was eligible for a bank
loan.
An important NGO collaborating with local groups is the Fédération Nationa-
le des Groupements de Promotion Féminine (FNGPF), a national fédération of
women's groups, established as an NGO in 1987. The fédération, to which thé
majority of Senegalese women's groups belong, helps organise thé annual
national campaign Quinzaine Nationale de la Femme Sénégalaise, which promotes
such issues as family planning, access to land and spécial projects for women.
From day to day it helps organise literacy and bookkeeping courses for thé
women's groups. The FNGPF uses part of the registration fee for crédit pur-
poses. In addition, by being organised as a formai organisation, it hopes to
attract donor funding. In 1996 thé FNGPF comprised 3600 women,s groups
with some 400,000 members (MFEF, 1997).
We may conclude that in the past few decades in Senegal a couple of
measures in line with donor thinking about 'good governance' have been taken
in the form of décentralisation and multiparty democracy NGOs encourage
thé organisation of thé population in so-called self-help groups in which thé
population is urged to participate actively in their own development From a
strongly state-led society, Senegal is being transformed into a society in which
people are supposed to act as citizens and as agents of development rather than
as subjects and as 'assisted' What is thé reality behind ail thèse measures and
supposed changes, however? To examine this question we turn to the rural
Community of Kaymor
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The local context: Kaymor community
The rural community of Kaymor is part of the subdistrict Médina Sabakh. In
1994 it had a population of 10,311, living in 23 villages. lts total area is 195
km2, giving a population density of about 60 people per km2. Ethnically and
religiously the community is fairly homogeneous: most are Wolof (90%) and
the remaining are mainly Toucouleur. All Wolof and Toucouleur are Muslim.
The main means of subsistence are agriculture and livestock husbandry.
Agriculture is limited to the sandy and alluvial soils, with the (unfertile) laterite
soils and dépressions and being dedicated to livestock-raising. All families
cultivate millet as a food erop. Groundnuts is by far the largest cash erop. In
the last decade small valleys and dépressions have been frequently cleared for
growing rice, maize and vegetables and for tree-planting. These activities
usually generale minor but much appreciated additional revenues (Kaag, 2001).
A genera! problem for agriculture is the widespread wind and water érosion.
The rieh farmers have large herds of cattle, up to 100 heads, while poor
farmers have only a few sheep and goats. Because of the extension of agricul-
tural lands, compétition problems between agriculture and husbandry have
come to develop over the last thirty years. Cattle farmers are consequently
finding it more and more difficult to keep cattle and find themselves obliged
to herd their animais at remoter locations. At the end of the dry season some
of them now opt to move to the south for several weeks to find food for their
cattle.
People live together in groups of patrilineal descent. A ward of a village or
a hamlet is composed of families related along the male line. Until two généra-
tions ago brothers tended to live together in one compound, but now each
adult male prefers to live independently in hls own house. However, mutual
aid between family members is still common, as exemplified in the obligation
to participate in working parties or to help in house-building (Venema, 1978
p. 96-100),
Owing to the pressure on land, borrowing land from family members is no
longer an option, and over the last decade a number of families have therefore
opted to move to a town or migrate to the less populated areas in the southern
Casamance région. In addition, as explained above, it has become far more
difficult to obtain groundnut seed on credit. The limited access to these
resources has sometimes resulted in tense relations within households and
families spilling over into other domains.
In addition to a horizontal organisation based on kinship, Wolof society is
highly hierarchical. The founding families of the villages in Kaymor community
belong to the class of the freeborn (diambour). They had as clients' families
from the class of artisans (nieenio), who made the required farm implements
and leatherwork but also practised agriculture as a main occupation. In addi-
tion, thé freeborn families had slave families (diam) who did most of the
agricultural work. They worked five mornings a week for their master, using
thé remaining time to till their own fields. No social class was excluded from
entitlement to land. Of the total population of Kaymor community, as in thé
subdistrict, almost half is freeborn, almost half slave born and about ten per
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cent artisan. At the beginning of the 20th Century the French colonial govern-
ment decreed that domestic slavery was to be abolished. In the community of
Kaymor the slaves left their masters in the 1930s to become independent
farmers, most of them continuing to live in their original village or in a nearby
hamlet. People are still aware of these former master-slave relations but they
are not discussed in public, as was still the case in the 1970s (Venema, 1978
pp. 124-129). Àlthough it is now taboo to talk about a person's status, class
distinctions appear to be a regulär cause of friction: thé freeborn remain
attached to their traditional status, while some of the lower class hâve achieved
influential positions, as a teacher or in a political party, for example.
With regard to thé rôle of women, thé dominant norm is that a wife should
be a good spouse by obeying her husband. For non-routine activities women
always ask the approval of the men, as when joining a women's group, for
instance. Because of ail their occupations, wornen appear to be poorly in touch
with topical affairs. When an NGO holds an information day, say, most women
appear uninformed. Women nevertheless hâve major responsibilities and in
practice they hâve considérable influence in thé household. They buy clothes,
ingrédients for meals, soap for thé laundry and so on, and arrange médical care
for themselves and their children. In polygamous families the wife whose turn
it is to cook is obliged to add her portion of flour to thé meal (ndollah). To
meet these responsibilities, she has access to a plot to cultivate groundnuts.
Because participation in a women's group may provide scope for additional
revenue, most men allow their wives to become members.
Few people hâve received primary éducation. The level of literacy in French
is between 10 en 20% (Kaag & Venema, 1997 pp. 18). Although more pupils
have recently been enrolled at the primary schools in the subdistrict, most are
boys. The koranic schools (dahra) dispersed in thé villages are more frequently
attended, by both boys and girls. In the last few years, literacy projects hâve
been initiated by a variety of organisations. Thèse are directed mainly towards
women.
'Good governance' at thé local level: thé rural council of Kaymor
The council between higher level administration and thé local community -
questions of accountability and representativeness
As mentioned above, within thé framework of its décentralisation policy from
1972 onwards Senegal has gradually been divided into 368 rural communities,
each administered by a rural council. In Kaymor thé rural council was estab-
lished in 1974. At the local level, however, this administrative reform was ill-
prepared. At a meeting thé village élite were simply told that from now on they
were to arrange affairs at their own level and that thé rural council was exactly
for that purpose. It was consequently thé local notables who took a seat in thé
council. They were seen by themselves and by thé population as representing
their respective villages. Although most were of freeborn or noble birth,
descendants of thé village founders, there were also a few descendants of slaves
and foreigners, including descendants of slaves who had founded their own
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village after manumission and foreigners who had become prominent members
of local society by making big money in the peanut business.
Some scholars (Blundo, 1991, 1995, Gellar, 1996, Ribot, 1999) hold that
the rural councils are not accountable to or représentative of the local popula-
tion, but accountable rnerely to the higher echelons of the political establish-
ment. After all, it is the Party that décides on candidacy and to a large extent
it is the means provided (or promised) by the upper-level administration and
the central state that allow local politicians to bind their clientèle.
In part this is true. The Party décides on the candidates for local élections.
This is done officially during a meeting of the section (the Party organ at the
Community level). The choice is made under thé supervision of a contrôleur
from the Party, who checks the list before it is approved by the section mem-
bers. In actual fact, however, whether someone is invested or not is decided
on by thé leaders of the Party at the level of the rural Community together with
the politicians at subdistrict level. They take into considération the candidate's
influence and esteem in nis village, the number of membership cards hè has
sold, whether hè has certain propaganda skills and whether hè and his follow-
ers can strengthen the position of the party in the rural community. Thus, it
is evident that only those candidates who dispose over following and legitimacy
at the local level have a chance of being elected.
With respect to the representativeness of the rural council, we observed that
the composition of Kaymor rural council had hardly changed in over twenty
years; the initial elite still continued ils reign. Women, ethnie minorities and
youngsters were clearly underrepresented: from the beginning there had been
only a single woman councillor, no Toucouleur and no young men. Things
changed, however, with the prolifération of factionalism and with the décen-
tralisation reforms of 1996, as we shall see in the next section.
Factionalism: growing loca! representativeness and growing conflicts
Factionalism has always been a characteristic of Senegalese politics (cf. Barker,
1973, Bayart, 1989, Jacob, 1997). This often took the form of rivalry between
two 'clans', or factions, within the PS, and it always concerned access to the
resources available at the national level. A strong vertical political organisation
was thus built, linking thé local to the national, an existing logic from which
the newly created rural councils could not escape (see, for example, Blundo,
1998). In thé rural Community of Kaymor, however, the political 'family' was
rather homogeneous and tied to the politician Mahmadou Wade at the national
level. Here, factionalism only sprang up at the end of the 1980s, as a resuit of
thé 'parachuting' of national politicians in search of clients'. After thé local
élections of 1990 thé division became working reality inside thé rural council
of Kaymor. From then on thé council of Kaymor was divided into tendance A
(fifteen members) and tendance B (seven members) Both factions hâve relations
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with PS politicians at a higher level1. The tendances hâve nothing to do with
political arguments; what seems important is to have good connections to get
a share of the 'cake'.
What is interesting is that because of the upcoming factionalism, certain
social catégories that previously had no chance of having a councillor now for
the first time gained représentatives because they came to be seen as useful
clients in 'thé battle of factions'. Thus, after 1990, four Toucoulour councillors
took a seat on thé rural council.
Representativeness was further increased with the reform of 1996: thé
winner-takes-all system was abandoned, which gave opposition parties an
opportunity to take a seat on thé council. In addition thé system of appointed
councillors was dropped; thé council was now to be composed of thirty-two
elected councillors. By means of a pro-active national campaign, supported by
thé large international donors, many women were invested as councillor. After
thé local élections of 1996 thé rural council of Kaymor was composed of:
twenty-six councillors for thé PS (fifteen for faction A, eleven for faction B),
five for thé PDS and one for thé LD/MTP. Of the thirty-two councillors, twenty
were new. There were six young men (under thé âge of forty) and five women
councillors. This implied a major change, be it that most of thé leaders of the
various catégories were still from thé old élite: local patrons, wives of notables
and youngsters from prominent familles.
Thus, factionalism permitted certain social catégories to gain a seat on thé
council, and in so doing it fostered a new dynamic. The phenomenon of
tendances, however, also leads to rivalries and situations of stalemate and
hampers the functioning of thé council, either because councillors of the rival
faction are kept uninformed or because they boycott the other's policy. In land
issues, for example, décisions are often taken in favour of militants of the
faction that is in power, leaving thé others in frustration. It is no wonder that
people of thé minority faction often refrain from presenting their case at all.
Even when décisions are not taken solely on factionalist grounds, people do
perceive it that way.
NGO représentatives may décide not to work in a village because of the
conflicts between tendances. The councillors of the village Médina Sabakh stood
in such opposition that an NGO agent decided in 1995 to no longer work in
thé village but only in other, smaller villages (Bierman 1995 p.51). In 1995,
USAID started to prépare a large project on natural resource management in
thé area in which it would involve thé population, other NGOs and thé rural
council. The idea was for populär participation to be organised within a
framework permitting due considération to be given to the interests of the
various groups of actors (PGCRN, 1995 p. 24). In this light thé rural council
of thé day was not considered an apt institution, because, so it was said, thé
manner of élection of thé council and its composition do not permit représenta-
tion of ail thé différent groups of actors present in the rural community
1 The leader of tendance A at thé level of thé depai tetnenl was Samou Toure, a government officiai who
has connections with Moustapha Niasse minister of Foreign Affairs The leader of tendance B was Modou
A'Bass Ba. a member of parhament and ex-minister
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Consequently, a new Institution was created to manage the project (in which
only three councillors would have a seat). As this management committee was
officially appointed as an assistant body to the council, it was hoped that it
would contribute to democratie changes in the rural council and in local
society at large, too. In the short run, however, it appeared that the factional-
ism that had still managed to creep in strongly hampered the coopération
between the rural council and the management committee, as well as exécution
of the project as a whole. The fact was that from Î996 onwards the rural
council was presided over by faction B, while the president of the management
committee was a member of faction A. With time, minor conflicts and rumours
proliferated and eventually tensions between the two présidents had mounted
so high they were no longer willing to participate in meetings together. The
project staff said it would have to leave if no solution were found. The two
opponents had little alternative but to climb down (Kaag, 2001),
Factionalism also occurs in other elected organisations, such as the coopéra-
tive: The chairman of the coopérative of Kaymor occupied this position from
the very beginning and because of his long and able record and his age hè was
a man of high standing. He feit hè was growing too old to continue the job,
though, and therefore announced that hè intended to resign. However, the
other members of the board insisted hè should continue: if hè withdraw, they
held, the coopérative would become plagued by conflicts between the two
factions. When his intention to resign became known, one of the factions had
in fact tried to obtain a majority in the board. For the chairman there was no
other choice than to remain in office.
The council budget: fight and 'development'
The rural councils dispose over a budget, generated mainly by rural taxation.
The council of Kaymor has an annual budget of between FCFA 5,000,000 and
6,000,000 (about $30,000)2. From the beginning, most Investment has been
in infrastructure: wells, school maintenance and road improvement and so on.
As stated above, from 1996 onwards the rural councils have had greater
powers in initiating policies in such areas as healthcare, natural resource
management, culture and éducation, land planning and habitat issues. This
transfer of competencies was not followed by any substantial transfer of
financial means, however, nor by appropriate guidance of how these responsi-
bilities were to be, or indeed could be, executed.. This is compounded by the
fact that most councillors are illiterate in French while official texts are avail-
able in that language only makes it difficult for them to personally access
information. As a conséquence, the main Investments of the council to date
have been tangible infrastructure works. Another main reason is that this kind
of infrastructure work is most visible to the people, and is as such a means for
the rural councülors to attract followers, or reward them for their support
during the élections.
•>
2 In 1993, 1994 and 1995 the budget was respectively FCFA 5,200,000, FCFA 5.300.000 and FCFA
6,000,000.
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Blundo (1998) shows how in another rural Community in Senegal the means
of the rural council and the rural Community are clearly spent according to a
factionalist logic. The faction that has gained the majority in the rural council
rewards lts followers by spending the budget on projects for their militants,
with the others having to await another mandate. In our case things seem to
be more complicated. In part the budget is spent according to a factionalist
logic, providing things for villages of the faction in power. However, funds are
also spent at villages with a councillor from faction B or no councillor at all.
In such cases, however, the sum earmarked often seems to have 'skimmed off'
to serve the councillors of the majority. These practices evidently reinforce
animosity and distrust between the two factions. Fights are not generally fought
out in the open, but rather by rumour campaigns and threats to inform the
sous-pré/et, the préfet or the police. Although this is in fact rarely done, it
heightens the atmosphère of animosity in the Community.
We may conclude that the councillors are part of the administration and
owe a deal of their influence to higher-level politica! patrons who décide on
candidacy and can provide the means for local patrons to gain and strengthen
their position. On the other hand, however, the rural councillors are part of
local society: they have to listen to their people in order to raise and maintain
support. Indeed, only with such support will they be eligible in the eyes of
their political patrons.
The émergence of factionalism at the end of the 1980s has increased the
dependency of local politicians on their followers. People now have the option
of choosing between candidates from different factions. Because of this faction-
alism and the move to further décentralisation in 1996, moreover, people that
had always been politically marginalized, such as Toucouleur, women, and
youngsters, now have a chance of taking a seat on the council. The birth of a
'factlonal mode of governance' Çgouvernementalitéfactionnelle', Blundo 1998)
seems to have broken down the monopoly of the old elite. The coming men
still adhère, however, to local rules as to who is capable and permitted to
speak: their leaders are local patrons, wives of notables or youngsters from
important families.
Thus, a shift can be discerned towards broader-based représentation of
different social catégories, but this looks set to be a long-term process. In the
short term, factionalism is a factor hampering the functioning of the rural
council, in that it leads to factional disputes, boycotts, exclusion and favourit-
ism. Development activities do take place, however, the council's budget being
used for infrastructure works that are important to the local population.
NGOs, self-help groups and 'real politics'
Self-help groups: new responsïbilities and new criteria of access
Caritas, a catholic NGO, and the American Peace Corps have been working m
the subdistnct Médina Sabakh since the 1960s. In the last fifteen years several
other NGOs and semi-governmental agencies joined in efforts in the subdistrict:
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Africare, POGV, PNVA, SODEVA, ISRA, the Norwegian Mission and USAID3.
We estimate that, with a few exceptions, all the 104 villages have links with
these NGOs and semi-governmental organisations.
The way these NGOs work and interact in local society reminds us of the
question Bayart (1996) poses about the usefulness of making a distinction
between the state and civil society in Africa. We thus found that local groups
set up by the NGOs have become politicised and infiltrated by party politics.
We take the example of the women's groups.
Traditionally, women have long participated in women's groups. At the age
of about 16 young women join a girl's group (xamb). The group assists mem-
bers in engagement and marriage festivities, helping prépare meals for instance,
and also plays a rôle in village festivals such as wrestling matches (lambe). On
leaving the girl's group to live with her husband she moves on to the group
of married women (mbotal), the leader of whom (yaye mbotaï) is always an
important woman, generally of freeborn descent. Here too the members help
one another with family ceremonies. They save a little money by collectively
tilling a plot. In addition, new mbotal members are obliged to pay an entrance
fee, provided by their husband. The money is used to buy kitchen provisions
such as kettles, bowls and wooden benches, which are used at the family
ceremonies. There is also mutual aid in the event of financial difficulty, when
some of the savings can be borrowed.
Women join modem self-help groups too. Most of these women's groups
are registered at the FNGPF and are then called Groupement de Promotion
Féminine (GPF). Women mention several motives for having joined a GPF and
for registering their group at thé FNGPF. They believe that by joining thé
fédération they will eventually be granted a project: receiving crédit to buy a
millet mill or sheep for fattening, for example. Such credit is available from
donors working with thé fédération or from thé fédération itself. As a second
motive, they say that a group can only ask for financial assistance from thé
rural council if it is registered. In addition, they mention that only registered
groups are visited by thé monitrice4.
The Fédération does have certain criteria for membership, however. A GPF
must first pay a registration fée of FCFA 22,000 and elect a board. Once it has
obtained a project, it must open a bank account. In addition, thé main task of
the group is to generate income for its members, through gardening, for
example, as is urged by the leaders of the Fédération and by the monitrice.
3 Africare is an American NGO POGV stands for 'Projet d'Organisation et de Gestion Villageois' and is
funded by IFAD PNVA stands for 'Programme National de Vulgarisation Agricole', fmanced by thé
Senegalese government and thé World Bank ISRA is thé 'Institut Senegalais de Recherches Agricoles',
funded by the state and foreign donors 'La Mission Norvégienne' is a Norwegian NGO, funded by a
Norwegian protestant church and thé Norwegian government
4 There seem to be no financiai restrictions on membership when asked. thé women say that poor
women can be members, too What counts is whether they are willing to work Poor women were indeed
members of thé women's groups Group membership costs an initial CFCA 250 300, with say FCFA 100
250 being paid once or twice a year to buy seed or pesticides If thé entrance fée proves problematical,
though, a solution can always be found, for example by paying later (cf Smetsers 1986)
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Some groups hâve decided to organise thèse activities within new groups,
others to combine them with thé usual activities of their mbotal. The latter is
thé case in thé hamlets and in large villages where wards are populous enough
to hâve a group of its own. Of the ten groups researched, five were organised
according to ward or hamlet and in thèse cases there was an overlap with the
mbotal. However, because not all women participate in a GPF as they do in thé
mbotal, members are sometimes recruited from différent wards, causing absence
of overlap with traditional groups.
Status group membership is a topic not discussed in public, neither does
it arise in relation to women's groups. Of the ten groups, five were organised
on a ward basis and, as a conséquence, had members belonging to the same
status group. According to the présidente of the FNGPF and the staff of the
CERP, status différences have no relevance for access to women's groups. They
claim that motivation is the crucial criterion for access: those with ambition
are welcome. Even the présidentes of the local groups bring forward this view.
Indeed, five groups have mixed membership.
In practice, however, différences in status do constitute a problem. In
Sonkorong, for example, because of outside interférence there is now only one
women's group, although the women are from three different status groups.
The freeborn women say they are not at all keen to cooperate with the artisan
women. Neither the wives of the village head nor the majority of the women
of the ward of the freeborn have joined this new group. In the other mixed
groups, too, there were rumours of frictions between women from different
status groups. Here they argued, however, that lack of discipline was more
important in organising work efficiently than différences in status. Although
there is no conclusive évidence, there are indications that having women of
different status working together in the new groups hampers efficient coopéra-
tion.
Income-earmng opportunities and access to land
The women argue that their main reason for joining a new self-help group is
that it créâtes new economie opportunities. Programmes set up by NGOs and
parastatals often involve the introduction of labour-saving and mcome-generat-
ing devices, such as millet milis and groundnut presses, with attendant funding
of literacy courses so that the women can manage the equipment obtained. To
date, twenty-two women's groups in the subdistrict have received a millet mill
on credit.
Most millet milis are able to generate profits, which are distributed among
members. Of the nine milis researched, seven were making profits while two
were still paying off their loans. The profits were divided among the members,
after part had been put aside as a fund from which loans could be taken during
the rainy season. If a member is in trouble she can normally borrow money
funds serve as a tide-over m difficult times.
Women also grow vegetables or millet on collective plots. Of the ten
women's groups, eight had a garden plot. These plots varied in size between
2000 and 3000 m2, with membership varying between seventeen and eighty.
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In addition, five groups had a collective groundnut or millet plot of between
>/2 and IVi ha.
It is generally one of the local farmers who provide the group a plot of land.
The plot may be reclaimed by the landholder at any time, without reason,
which makes income génération by such groups a rather precarious business.
Women's groups are beginning to gain other forms of access to land, however.
The land tenure rights of the thirteen collective plots were as follows: one
group rents a l '/2 ha plot; one has bought a l ¥2 ha plot; two have obtained land
from the council, and the women say the land now belongs to them; nine have
received a plot in usufruct in the traditional way. Under pressure from donors
and NGOs, as well as the FNGPF, women's groups are starting to ask for
official allotment of land, a trend that is also reflected in our particular subdis-
trict (Kaag, 2001).
This access to land should however be seen in a context of the worsening
conditions the women are having to face. In the rural Community of Kaymor,
as elsewhere, women have their personal plot in usufruct, often a different plot
each year. Because all fertile land is now occupied and population pressure is
on the rise, women are obtaining smaller plots and some heads of households
are no longer in a position to give their wife or wives a plot. In such cases a
woman turns to her family members for help, but often to no avail. Increased
population pressure has thus left women with mounting concerns. Engaging
in horticulture is one of the avenues women use in endeavouring to overcome
this structural problem.
Women becoming gradually more informed
In addition, membership of a women's group allows women to be better
informed, because they have access to new information. At information meet-
ings to which the women's groups are called by the subdistrict officer, the
women are informed by NGO staff or the monitrice about nutrition, healthcare,
family planning, textile painting or new types of stoves. Child vaccination
appeals organised by the Ministry of Health are also directed at the women's
groups.
As stated above, eight NGOs or semi-governmental organisations were
working in the subdistrict, where they were in contact with almost all the
villages. Seven organisations work with women's groups, most of them regis-
tered as a GPF or a GIE (on one we have no information). Thus, being organ-
ised in a women's group means that the women are in direct contact with an
NGO operating in the area and become involved in development activities.
Another advantage enjoyed by women's groups is that board members have
access to training, in literacy or bookkeeping, for instance. It used to be the
councillors who managed the millet milis, acquired through donor funding or
financed by the rural council budget. They controlled the revenues, which soon
resulted in a backlog of maintenance. Between 1974 and 1988 the three rural
councils and donors together distributed seventy-two millet milis to women's
groups in the subdistrict, which then were monopolised by council members.
In 1988 only sixteen of these were still in opération (CERP 1994). The milis
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managed by the women themselves operate better. They have followed a course
in bookkeeping and have opened a bank account. Profits are distributed among
the members and not pocketed by the 'responsitte', discussed below, as was the
case when the milis were managed by men.
State retreat and absence of technical assistance to self-help groups
At Médina Sabakh is the government's Centre d'Expansion Rurale Polyvalente
(CERP), whose staff provides technical development support. The head,
specialised in agriculture, is backed up by a veterinary agent, a forestry agent
and a monitrice. Apart from the head, there is also another field worker for
agriculture attached to the CERP, but he is on the staff of a programme funded
by the World Bank. Two staff members are lacking: a health worker and an
agent for assisting local coopératives. A staff of five thus has to serve a popula-
tion of some 33,000.
In addition, until recently the CERP had a chronic lack of means for con-
tacting the population. Up to 1996, it had only one old car and a mère 600
Utres of fuel per annum to go out in the field; it was consequently unable to
visit the villages. Since the arrivai of a USAID project the situation has im-
proved and now a second car is available, although officially it may only be
used for activities related to said project.
However, women's groups generally need help with the bookkeeping of the
revenues of their millet mill or groundnut press, with cultivating their gardens
and so on. Formally, they can count on the assistance of the monitrice. In fact,
it is her job to assist in the aforementioned tasks, as well as to organise meet-
ings to inform the women on such topics as family planning and nutrition in
the three women's centres of the subdistrict. Apart from the latter, the monitrice
occupies herself with two women's groups in the village Médina Sabakh and
assists three women's groups in other locations, where a World Bank project
has financed three millet milis and literacy courses. Her activities are thus
rather limited, which she attributes to her lack of transport facilities. She
prefers to wait for an opportunity to be driven in the CERP car. In short, the
monitrice is not able to properly assist the women's groups in the subdistrict
and there is in fact an organisational vacuüm.
Politica! interférence
As argued above, from the point of view of the women, formation of a women's
group is a rational course of action. Because the government extension service
is unable to support the women's groups, however, they become dependent
on men. The women's groups generally have a male représentative to assist
them, a person they call the responsable. It is these responsables who actually
establish the women's groups They ensure a board is elected and money
collected to pay for the entrance fee, after which they register the group at the
FNGPF. Of the ten women's groups, eight have a responsable; so only two
operate independently. Rumour has it that the responsables pocket some of the
fee money, although we found no cut-and-dry cases. It seems unlikely that very
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much is pocketed, because of the close relationship of the responsable and the
présidente or trésorière, often being their husband or son. Women's groups
appear to be very dependent on the responsable, as the following example
shows.
In Medina Sabakh two new groups were founded in 1996: Bokk Xalaat and Jamm ak
Salam. Both are run entirely by the responsable. When a female researcher interviewed
the présidente of the Bokk Xalaat group, she soon proved unable to answer several
questions. For example, she did not know whether the group was registered at the
FNGPF. She soon decided to call the responsable, who immediately took over the
discussion: the group was apparently registered and hè could tell a lot more. The
présidente said that next time she should address her questions directly to him, because
hè was the responsable.
The same happened when she interviewed the présidente of the group Jamm ak Salam,
who had invited two other members of the group along. When asked for the name of the
group, the three women starled a long discussion. Later they called for the responsable,
in fact her son. From that moment on the women were silent: the floor was for the
responsable.
It appeared that the women's groups have become connected to party politics
through the responsable. In five of the elght cases the responsable proved to be
a rural councillor affiliated to a political party. The women argued that they
prefer to have a councillor as responsable, as this improves theïr chances of
access to rural council funds. The presidentes of the women's groups do not
themselves lobby within the council because they do not feel in a position to
do so. From the connection between politics and women's groups leadership,
it follows that they will hardly receive any council funds if their responsable
belongs to a minority on the council.
Rumour has it that the councillors take a portion of the council budget for
their own private funds and some women did not deny this, having to pay a
substantial 'gift' in order to obtain funding. In contrast, money coming from
NGOs, through FNGPF or otherwise, is often paid directly to présidentes,
making male misuse less feasible, although here too a 'gift' sometimes has to
be paid.
From the political connection it follows that the positions of présidente and
responsable are affirmed in local élections. After the élections there are endea-
vours by district politicians to replace local leaders depending on the polling
results. Replacement is quite frequently resented, resulting in the schisms
within women's groups5.
In Kaymor there was one GPF wuh a responsable and présidente both connected with
PS faction A. However, after the 1990 élections there was a schism and there is now a
second group with a présidente and a responsable from PS faction B. When the présidente
of the new group was asked why there were now two groups she said that in every large
village you could find more than one group. At the end of the discussion, though, H
appeared that within the group there had been dissatisfaction about the way in which
5 Of the 54 women groups researched in the subdistrict, 38 were connected to PS faction a, 12 to PS
faction B and 4 to PDS
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the accounts were kept. A councillor of PS faction B exploited this fact m order to create
thé second group, which was then also registered. When, after thé local élections of 1996,
thé présidente of this second group opted to support faction A again, this councillor
created a third group in 1997 with a présidente from faction B
As a conclusion, we argue that women's groups are affiliated to thé political
parties through their responsables, most often rural councillors. Women accept
this because it gives them access to thé council budget, funds from which they
very much need. However, they resent thé fact that councillors (are held to)
pocket council funds. Things become worse if women are affiliated to a minor-
ity party in thé council: they will not receive much help because thé money
is channelled to thé majority faction or party.
This political connection results in thé drawback that reponsables and
présidentes are replaced depending on thé polling results. Because leadership
of women's groups has become dépendent on local élections, effective leader-
ship has become undermined because political criteria have become more
important than technical and organisational skills. This is clearly resented by
thé women.
Before 1996, there were only two female councillors in thé subdistrict of
a total of sixty-three. The current vogue to hâve women as candidates on party
lists led to fourteen women being elected in thé local élections of 1996. This
means that more women's groups will be able to operate without a male
responsible beyond thé two groups who currently do so.
Women's groups hâve corne co-opted by party-politics, which is hampering
their opération. At the same time, though, these women's groups are able to
create scope for income génération by their members. Since thé appearance of
women's groups on thé scène, many millet mills are managed by thé women,
where they were formerly appropriated by councillors. Projects like collective
tillage of a garden or millet field are far less remunerative because of problems
of labour organisation and lack of technical assistance. In any case, thèse small
projects cannot do away with thé fact that thé women feel frustrated at losing
access to their traditional farmlands.
The pressure of the 'donor regime' on décentralisation and thé création of
women's groups thus offers a mixed balance, opening new opportunities but
at the same time increasing dependency.
Conclusion
In this article we hâve examined 'good governance' as an expression of a donor
regime that is evolving Worldwide. By applying thé criterion of 'good gover-
nance' to third-world countries, donors contribute to a condensation of the
global network. Here, however, we hâve considered thé other side of the
global-local continuüm' a Senegalese locality where thé conséquences of
implementing 'good governance' are felt, but also where such governance gains
a content and dynamic of its own. On this basis we may conclude that Imple-
mentation of 'good governance' measures does not necessarily or only lead to
greater efficiency, democracy and peace (as those in favour of 'good gover-
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nance' might predict), but neither solely to greater conflict and exploitation
(as critics might argue).
Décentralisation measures in the form of installation of a rural council with
its own budget has created a local arena that can contested using local means.
It has also led to greater local influence of the PS, the national ruling party,
by creating a more directly vertical connection between the local and higher
levels of administration. Because of this connection, at the end of the 1980s
factionalism within the PS, always present at the national level, descended to
the local, Community level of Kaymor.
This factionalism proved to be a obstacle to proper functioning of the rural
council, in that it led to factional disputes, boycotts, exclusion and favouritism.
On the other hand, as a conséquence of this factionalism and of the new rules
of participation introduced by the décentralisation of 1996, minorities such
as ethnie minorities, women and youngsters got a chance to become elected
to the council, Within these catégories, however, local norms and values are
still operative: those elected are local patrons, wives of notables or youngsters
from prominent families. Thus, there appears to be a shift towards broader-
based représentation of the various social catégories, as urged by the advocates
of 'good governance'; it is an inch-meal process, however.
The présence of NGOs is another result of the quest for 'good governance':
'less state'and greater grassroots participation. We saw that NGOs brought
resources to the local level and fostered the création of new forms of coopéra-
tion and organisation such as formal women's groups. These groups can
provide income, land, prestige and a feeling of security to the women who
participate. We saw also, however, that potential access to funds also attracts
mâle politicians. In assisting women's groups in bureaucratie and organisational
matters and in contacting NGOs they are often able to acquire a share in thé
funds. Thus, in thé case of thé women's groups, too, the input or promise of
input of funds provided by thé présence of NGOs often leads to politicisation
and conflicts and to fights over the means and power available. Most frequent-
ly, women are the dependent party.
Nevertheless, we can discern a process of women becoming more informed
by way of literacy and bookkeeping courses. The economie power they gain
through their activities also contributes to their gaining more influence. It must
be added, though, that women hâve less access to the traditional farmlands.
Women's groups collectively tilling millet, groundnut or vegetables plots is
simply one means of attempting to overcome this crucial problem.
We may conclude that décentralisation and thé présence of NGOs, pro-
moted in order to arrive at 'good governance', initiale and reinforce différent
processes at thé local level. There is the acute struggle over means, reinforcing
conflict and factionalism, which in thé short run often leads to stagnation in
thé council and in thé functioning of women's groups. There are slower
processes of émancipation. There are direct profits: however, thèse are not
distributed evenly among thé population but generally accrue to thé followers
of the ruling faction. In other situations, men skim off the product of women's
work. Nevertheless, thèse profits do contribute to thé économie development
of the Community.
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What we hâve tried to show is that thé idea of 'good governance' is neither
a magie formula for development nor a nonsense concept of no use. Formai
changes in organisations and procédures are certainly not sufficient to arrive
at better governance. Political factors play an important rôle. Political power
relations are not fixed, however, and may change partly as a resuit of formai
changes. What is factually important is that thé 'global' idea of 'good gover-
nance' acquires its own content and dynamic at thé local level, in thé empirical
reality of spécifie local circumstances. It is more useful to unravel this process,
and in so doing learn more about how thé local and thé global interact and as
such enable as well as constrain actors' activities and stratégies, than to simply
state that Implementation of 'good governance' will or will not lead to 'develop-
ment'.
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